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Abstract. This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing an inconsistent 
empirical theory. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoiding 
that the inconsistent consequences of a theory are both potential corroborators and 
falsifiers of the same theory. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a 
class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such 
inconsistent theory: the class of its potential refuters. In spite of this, I show that the 
contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (if we accept some 
assumptions), but not refuted. From this, it follows that an inconsistent theory 
cannot be falsified qua inconsistent. 
Keywords: logic of science; falsificationism; paraconsistency; dialetheism; 
contradictions; negation; negative facts 
Resumen. Este artículo discute la posibilidad lógica de contrastar una teoría 
empírica inconsistente. El principal reto para responder afirmativamente es evitar 
que las consecuencias inconsistentes de una teoría sean a la vez corroboradores y 
falsadores de la misma teoría. Respondo afirmativamente mostrando que podemos 
definir una clase de enunciados empíricos cuya verdad nos obligaría a abandonar 
tal teoría inconsistente: la clase de sus refutadores potenciales. A pesar de esto, 
muestro que las contradicciones implícitas en una teoría sólo podrían ser 
verificadas (si aceptamos algunos presupuestos), pero no refutadas. De esto se 
deduce que una teoría inconsistente no puede ser falsificada en tanto inconsistente. 
Palabras clave: lógica de la ciencia; falsación; paraconsistencia; dialeteismo; 
contradicciones; negación; hechos negativos 
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1 Introduction 
It was seven decades ago that the first formal approach for handling inconsistencies 
was published (cf. Jaśkowski 1999) and, since then, several other paraconsistent 
logics appeared with several applications. The paraconsistent programme is often 
associated with dialetheism: the view that some sentences are both true and false or 
that there are true contradictions. These dialetheias, as Priest calls them, need not 
to be observation sentences; i.e. sentences expressing experienceable states of 
affairs. Nevertheless, the existence of empirical dialetheias has been suggested by 
da Costa (1980) and Priest (2006), which would justify the acceptance of 
inconsistent theories in the empirical sciences. 
The procedure for testing one such theory, though, have been barely discussed. For 
instance, the only proposal for applying the principle of falsifiability to inconsistent 
theories is Piscoya’s (1995, ch. II.3), who proposes that, in order for a theory 𝑇 to be 
falsifiable, it must be non-trivial; that is, it must fail to imply at least one sentence. 
Moreover, a potential falsifier of 𝑇 would be any sentence 𝜑 such that the set 𝑇 ∪
{𝜑} be trivial, which means that it implies any sentence whatsoever. 
However, some logics take great pains to avoid trivialisation, like strongly 
paraconsistent logics (cf. Perzanowski, 2001, p. 8). This could be taken as evidence 
that such logics simply cannot be used in empirical science. But this is too easy an 
answer. The paraconsistent programme has been here for some decades now and it 
deserves to be seriously considered in any rational enterprise. 
In section 2, I discuss the appropriate logical form of the observable sentences; i.e. 
sentences denoting observable states of affairs. In section 3, the negations of 
observable sentences are also observable, which is a necessary condition for 
observable contradictions. The empirical content of a theory is expressed via 
observable sentences that can corroborate or falsify that theory. This idea is 
clarified in section 4, but the concept of potential falsifier there defined is proved 
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inappropriate for inconsistent theories. This situation is rectified in section 5, where 
I defend that inconsistent theories have to undergo a two-sided testing process, for 
which I define a more appropriate concept of potential falsifier. Finally, section 6 
presents a thought experiment where I apply my proposal. 
2 Observable Sentences 
A language 𝐿 worth of empirical science comprises sentences of at least two kinds: 
theoretical and observation sentences. The former are unverifiable. There is no 
practical way to know if they are true because their logical form is that of universal 
sentences, like: 
Sentence 1. For all x and y, the speed of x is less or equal than the speed of light at 
circumstance y. 
Observable sentences instead are verifiable—that is, if we accept that there is 
something that experience can verify. 1  Their logical form is that of singular or 
existential sentences. 
Sentence 2. For some x and y, the speed of x is less or equal than the speed of light 
at circumstance y. 
Sentence 3. The speed of a is less or equal than the speed of light at circumstance c. 
The existential sentence 2 is a logical consequence of sentence 1, and so is the 
singular sentence 3, provided a is in the domain of discourse. That is not to say that 
all existential and singular sentences denote observable states of affairs. But some 
of them do, and no universal sentence can. Accordingly, the set observable sentences 
needs to be a subset of the set of singular and existential sentences of 𝐿. But although 
we need not to restrict our observable sentences to only one of these sets, there are 
good reasons for doing so. 
 
1 Epistemologists know that, by itself, no theory implies observable states of affairs because some 
assumptions have to be made about our instruments and the initial conditions of the case to be tested 
—cf. Lakatos (1978, ch. 1). I take all such assumptions for granted in order to simplify my exposition. 
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For example, Popper prefers existential sentences in order to represent the 
asymmetry between theoretical sentences and its potential falsifiers, so that the 
negation of a potential falsifier cannot preserve its logical form.2 But we need that 
the negation of an observable sentence be also observable; otherwise, it will not 
make sense to say of a contradiction that is observable. And whereas the negation 
of a singular sentence is also a singular sentence—e.g. sentences 3 and 3’—, the 
negation of an existential sentence is a universal one—e.g.  sentences 2 and 2’—; 
that is, a sentence that cannot possible be verifiable. This excludes existential 
sentences. 
Sentence 1’. For some x and y, the speed of x is greater than the speed of light at 
circumstance y. 
Sentence 2’. For all x and y, the speed of x is greater than the speed of light at 
circumstance y. 
Sentence 3’. The speed of a is greater than the speed of light at circumstance c. 
In order to avoid redundancy, the domain of φ and ψ will be restricted to the 
observable singular sentences of 𝐿. 
3 Observing Negation 
The aforementioned presupposes that for each singular sentence, if it expresses an 
observable state of affairs, so does its negation. Let us make some assumptions 
about observability to justify this claim. 
Assumption I. That φ is observable does not mean that it is currently observable. 
By currently observable, I mean observable with current available instruments and, 
by observable, I mean possibly observable. This difference manifests itself when we 
advance theories implying consequences that we do not have the proper 
 
2 “[W]ir müssen die logische Form der Basissätze so bestimmen, daß die Negation eines Basissatzes 
seinerseits kein Basissatz sein kann” (Popper, 1935, p. 58). ‘Basic sentence’ (Basissatz) is 
synonymous with ‘potential falsifier’ in this context. 
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instruments to observe, but that provide the theoretical basis for constructing them 
in the future. For instance, the existence of gravitational waves was predicted by 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity already in 1916, but it was not until 2015 
that they could be observed, almost one hundred years later! 
Assumption I also covers the cases where 𝜑 is currently observable, but not so 𝜑. 
For example, the concept of musical pitch was already implicit in Pythagoras. Hence, 
it is to be expected that meaning of the following sentences could be understood by 
him. 
Sentence 4. The pitch of that whistle is B8 (~7.9 kHz). 
Sentence 5. The pitch of that whistle is B10 (~31.6 kHz). 
But while he could have verified sentence 4 with his own ears —although with some 
margin of error—, he could not have possible verified sentence 5: he lacked the 
proper instruments for that. Yet, this does not mean that sentence 5 cannot possibly 
be observed. This first assumption will not be used for proving the main claim of 
this section (but see section 4), so let us jump to the next. 
Assumption II. 𝜑 is observable iff there is a 𝜓 incompatible with 𝜑 by definition. 
This follows if we agree with Bobenrieth that negation “does not reflect or represent 
something in reality but something that we do with reality” (2007, p. 508) and, 
hence, that “there is no perception of negative facts”, for “negation is an operation 
given by virtue of our category schemes” (1996, p. 407). Priest’s arguments for 
observable contradictions (1999, 2002) are not at odds with Bobenrieth’s remarks. 
He recognises that “inference may well play some role in rational reconstruction of 
how [seeing] proceeds” (1999, p. 441). This is why it is, in principle, possible to see 
that something is not red: we just need to see that it has some property incompatible 
with redness according to our definitions. 
Nevertheless, inference seems to play no role when we see that Pierre is not in the 
room because we are seeing an empty room. It may be possible to argue that Pierre 
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is defined as something incompatible with emptiness. But since Priest does not 
explain how could we observe a situation where Pierre is and is not in the room, I 
will make no further comment. 
Assumption III. For all 𝜑, there is a 𝜓 incompatible with 𝜑. 
 Suppose that no 𝜓 is incompatible with 𝜑. This can only mean that L cannot express 
an observable situation incompatible with 𝜑 . It follows then either that φ 
necessarily holds or that our language cannot express such 𝜓. Since it serves no 
purpose to test necessary claims, the former case is irrelevant. And so is the second 
because we need sufficiently expressive languages. Hence, assumption III must hold, 
and so my initial claim that: 
Assumption IV. If 𝜑 is observable, so is ¬𝜑. 
By assumption III, there must be an observable 𝜓 incompatible with 𝜑, which by 
assumption II implies that 𝜑 is observable. 
4 Empirical Content 
A theory 𝑇  can be represented as a subset of 𝐿  closed under a relation of 
consequence ⊢ . The sentences in 𝑇  are its axioms and theorems. Observable 
sentences are crucial for understanding the empirical content of 𝑇: they can either 
corroborate it or falsify it. Any observable singular sentence expressing a case 
where 𝑇 holds is to be called a potential corroborator of 𝑇. 
Definition PC. 𝜑 is a potential corroborator of 𝑇 iff 𝑇 ⊢ 𝜑. 
If 𝑇 entails sentence 1, then sentence 3 is a potential corroborator of 𝑇. Theories, 
though, can never be (ultimately) verified; they can only be (almost ultimately) 
falsified. This why it is more important to detect the sentences that contradict T, like 
(1’–3’). Any observable sentence contradicting 𝑇 fulfils the following variation of 
Popper’s definition of potential falsifier: 
Definition PF. 𝜑 is a potential falsifier of 𝑇 iff 𝑇 ⊢ ¬𝜑. 
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Sentence 3’ clearly fulfils this definition. Provided circumstance c is at our reach, it 
is possible to observe that the speed of a is greater than the speed of light at c. That 
this was never observed is not related to the testability of sentence 3’, but to that 𝑇 
is very probably right. 
But definition PF poses two problems for inconsistent theories. First, the logic 
assumed by Popper is classical and, since in that case any inconsistent 𝑇 is trivial, its 
class of potential falsifiers will be useless. The paraconsistent way to address this, 
which I will follow, is just letting ⊢ be paraconsistent. The second problem is of a 
more difficult nature. Suppose we have a non-trivial theory 𝑇 such that 𝑇 ⊢ 𝜑 and 
𝑇 ⊢ ¬𝜑, for some 𝜑. By definitions PC and PF we have that both 𝜑 and ¬𝜑 are, at 
the same time, potential corroborators and falsifiers of 𝑇. This is inconvenient for 
two reasons. First, since 𝜑 and ¬𝜑 are observable, it is to be expected that at least 
one of them holds, which means that 𝑇 would have to be a priori rejected. But even 
if we discard that one of 𝜑 or ¬𝜑 needs to be true, this just would mean that if both 
(or any) is observed we have to reject 𝑇 , which is just the opposite to what a 
dialetheist would expect from 𝑇. 
This was probably in Priest’s mind when he proposed to reject a theory such that 
𝑇 ⊢ 𝜑 ∧ ¬𝜑, if we do not observe 𝜑 ∧ ¬𝜑 (Priest, 2002, p. 125). Notwithstanding 
Priest’s best falsificationist intentions3, this is a verificationist tentative where we 
have to reject 𝑇  in the absence of positive evidence and not because of negative 
evidence. 
But even if we accept this form of verificationism, things do not add up. Suppose 𝑇 ⊢
𝜑 ∧ 𝜓 , where 𝜑  and 𝜓  do not contradict in any way. It can be the case that we 
observe 𝜑, but do not observe any of 𝜓 or ¬𝜓. In such case, no scientist would say 
that 𝜑 ∧ 𝜓  is to be rejected, for this might be due to limitations in our current 
 
3  Cf. “[T]he central uses of deductive argument are (i) to stablish new truths from old (as in 
mathematics) and (ii) to establish old falsehoods from new (as in experimental refutation).” (2006, 
p. 84) 
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instruments. Assumption I shows precisely why this does not have to be different if 
𝑇 ⊢ 𝜑 ∧ ¬𝜑. Suggesting that it should be otherwise looks more like an attempt by 
the dialetheist of “dictating science from the armchair” (Arenhart, 2018, p. 20). 
5 Potential Falsifiers 
Malgrado tutto, Priest’s proposal has the strength that if we were to observe both 𝜑 
and ¬𝜑, the improbability of such state of affairs (cf. Priest, 2006, sec. 8.4) would 
give 𝑇 a great support. This means that an inconsistent theory can receive support 
without the need of a falsification test. But if we never corroborate its 
contradictions, we have no logical way of rejecting 𝑇 and, hence, it is not clear what 
its epistemic status is. 
All this is a consequence of a fundamental difference between classical and 
paraconsistent logic. In classical logic, 𝛼 is true iff ¬𝛼 is false. This means that the 
truth conditions of a sentence depend on its falsity conditions, and vice versa. This 
is why when we define the semantics of some logical functor ∘ we state that 𝛼 ∘ 𝛽 is 
true in the such and such conditions, and false otherwise. (We can alternatively state 
that 𝛼 ∘ 𝛽 is false in the such and such conditions, and true otherwise.) But this is not 
the case for paraconsistent logics because it may be that both 𝛼 and ¬𝛼 be true. In 
such logics, truth conditions are (at least partially) independent from falsity 
conditions as Priest’s semantics of propositional connectives show (2006, p. 75). It 
is no wonder that paraconsistent logics makes contradictory sentences impossible 
to reject, since some of these logics make them automatically false (as well as true). 
Consequently, any inconsistent 𝑇 that wants to prove its mettle needs to undergo a 
two-sided testing process. First, it needs to test positive in some corroboration tests 
aimed to corroborate 𝑇; e.g. the verification of some unfalsifiable consequence of 𝑇, 
like a contradiction. Second, it needs to test negative in some falsification tests aimed 
to falsify 𝑇. While the latter will test 𝑇 in a Popperian way, the former will hopefully 
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reveal whether some of its contradictions hold. There does not seem to be a way 
reduce both tests to only one. But how are we to define the class of sentences that 
can make us falsify or reject 𝑇? 
The rationale for this is very straightforward. Let 𝑃𝐹(𝑇) and 𝑃𝐶(𝑇) be the sets of 
potential falsifiers and corroborators of 𝑇, respectively. Now, the sentences whose 
verification should force us to reject 𝑇 will be called potential refuters of 𝑇. The set 
𝑃𝑅(𝑇) of potential refuters of 𝑇 can be defined as the set of those potential falsifiers 
of 𝑇 that are not also its potential corroborators. In a set-theoretical language, this 
can be expressed as follows: 
Definition PR. 𝑃𝑅(𝑇) = 𝑃𝐹(𝑇) − 𝑃𝐶(𝑇)  
This new definition poses a challenge in comparison to definition PF. The latter only 
requires us to derive the theorems of 𝑇  to obtain its potential falsifiers. Any 
observable sentence contradicting some 𝜑 in 𝑇 is its PPF (unless 𝑇 is inconsistent). 
But that does not suffice for definition PR: we also need to prove that ¬𝜑 is not a 
theorem of 𝑇, which is usually more difficult. The good news is that PF is a special 
case of PR: whenever ⊢ is classical it all comes to the sentences contradicting 𝑇. 
6 The Inconsistent Phone: A Though Experiment 
The fertility of my proposal (or the lack thereof) cannot be decided in a logical 
investigation such as this. It is necessary to test some inconsistent empirical theory 
with it. Since I am no dialetheist, I am not compelled to carry out such investigation. 
All I offer instead is a thought experiment exemplifying its application. 
Daniel is a party person who, one day, drank so much that he lost consciousness. 
When he woke up, he was alone in a friend’s flat with the door locked up and without 
his phone. It is imperative for Daniel to know the time because he works early in the 
morning. If it is past 7:00, he will have to force the door. Otherwise, he will wait for 
his friend to appear. 
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Daniel makes then some reasonable assumptions and derive some logical 
consequences from them. But the resulting “theory” happens to be inconsistent, for 
it states that it is both 1:34 and 9:41, from which follows that it is not 0:00, 0:01, …, 
and 23:59. Now, by definition PC, the sentences indicating that it is both 1:34 and 
9:41 at this circumstance are potential corroborators of Daniel’s “theory”. And by 
definition PR, the sentences stating that at this circumstance it is any of 0:00, 0:01, 
…, and 23:59, except 1:34 and 9:41, are potential refuters of the “theory”. Daniel 
finds this “theory” useless—the times predicted are in both sides of the deadline—
and in searching for some clock he finds a phone whose screen is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The dialetheic phone. 
Surprisingly enough, the “theory” passed a refutation test because none of its 
potential refuters holds according to his observation. It also passed a corroboration 
test since he observed that it is 1:34 and 9:41 at the same circumstance. This breath-
taking outcome, of course, gives no practical answer to Daniel’s dilemma. But it 
establishes inconsistent theories can be tested in a quasi-Popperian way. 
Of course, this does not seem to express the kind situation a dialetheist might find 
possible. Which is why it is not surprising that, some instants later, Daniel’s friends 
come from outside the flat bringing some beer. It is 2:56 according to their (properly 
working) phones, which means that Daniel’s “theory” tested positive in these new 
falsification tests—although he will wonder for a while whether the phones of his 
friends were to be trusted. 
This silly example is by no means the intended target of my investigation. 
Nevertheless, the task of testing inconsistent theories is no longer mine, but of the 
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empirical dialetheists, if there is any. If they choose to gloss over this task, they better 
stop pretending there could be some true empirical contradictions, for they have 
simply failed to test a single theory containing one. 
But even if they succeed in testing an inconsistent theory as I am suggesting here, 
empirical dialetheists still have to deal with the undesirable consequence that 
inconsistent empirical theories cannot be refuted qua inconsistent, they can only be 
verified as such (provided we accept assumptions I-IV). This would make empirical 
dialetheism a deeply dogmatic position; contrary to a scientific spirit that seeks not 
only to corroborate, but also the opportunity to refute its hypotheses, or at least to 
shake them. It is not possible to object in this case—in the style of Reichenbach, 
Neurath and Kuhn—that falsificationism proposes an oversimplified model of 
scientific practice. Empirical dialetheism has not been able to adequately satisfy 
even this model and, hence, it cannot be expected to satisfy a more sophisticated 
one. 
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